This paper considers a two-period model in which managers have superior information about their ability to forecast the realization of given investment projects. Firms compete for managers by offering short-run contracts. As future salaries depend on current play through its impact on managerial reputation, managers' investment decisions are affected by their concern for their future careers. We analyze the interaction between these implicit incentives, created by managers' career concerns, and the explicit incentives made possible by contingent compensation. We show that managers' career concerns create perverse incentives that are robust to the introduction of contingent contracting. We also find that while managerial compensation is monotonically increasing in profit at date 2, it is not at date 1. Two numerical exercises relate the implications of our results to the literature on the link between pay and performance. In line with empirical findings, we find that: i) the pay-performance sensitivity is highest in the final period of managers' employment; ii) higher pay-performance sensitivities are associated with a lower variance of profits.
Introduction
The literature on managerial compensation has dedicated a close attention to the trade-o¤ in the provision of incentives and insurance arising because of managers' risk and e¤ort aversions. In this paper we depart from this view and focus on the impact of managers' talent on managerial compensation and incentives. In particular we consider a market for managerial services and analyze the interplay of implicit (reputational) and explicit (compensation) incentives of managers. A manager is assumed to have private information about his ability to distinguish a pro…table investment project from an unpro…table one. Firms have imperfect knowledge about this ability, and therefore the investment decision of a manager and its …nal outcome are used to update the estimates of his skills. Because of this dependance on the past, a manager's choices are in ‡uenced by his preoccupation with his future salaries, a component which we will refer to as career or reputational concern. This paper studies how, when, and to what extent short-run contingent contracts can o¤set the distortions created by career concerns and analyzes the implications of this on investment decisions, contracts, and the link between pay and performance measures. To address these issues we construct a two-period model of managerial compensation with career concerns and characterize equilibrium contracts and investment decisions.
We …nd that managers' reputational concerns create perverse incentives that can be only partially o¤set by contingent compensation. In particular we show that (i) investment decisions in period 2 are e¢cient, but investment decisions in period 1 depend on managers' initial reputation: A manager will overinvest when his reputation is low, invest e¢ciently when it is high and underinvest when it is intermediate; (ii) managerial compensation is monotonically increasing in performance in period 2 but not in period 1: Generous compensation in the face of poor results may be required to induce managers to take appropriate investment actions that may compromise their future careers. 1 We explore the implications of our results by performing two numerical exercises on the joint distribution of equilibrium salaries and performance measures with the goal to verify whether the predictions of the model are consistent with existing empirical studies.
Our …rst numerical exercise …nds that the pay-performance sensitivity is higher in the …nal period of managers' employment than in the initial one, in line with Gibbons and Murphy's (1992) empirical …nding that the pay-performance elasticities of CEO's of large US companies increase as they approach retirement. Our second numerical exercise demonstrates that the pay-performance sensitivity is decreasing in the …rm's variance of pro…ts, in line with the empirical …ndings of Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) .
The theoretical models that motivated the previous empirical research focused their attention on the optimal design of incentives for homogenous risk averse managers to exert appropriate levels of e¤ort. 2 In contrast, our model proposes a di¤erent perspective on the agency relationship between managers and shareholders-one that is centered on competing …rms that try to provide incentives to make appropriate decisions for risk neutral managers who may have private information about their forecasting ability. Although we share the general view that managerial risk aversion is a fundamental component of the agency relationship between management and ownership, in this paper we abstract from it to focus on the impact of career concerns and asymmetric information on managerial contracting. Our numerical exercises show that our predictions are not invalidated by documented empirical regularities, and we therefore consider our model as a possibly complementary view of the nature of the agency relationship between management and ownership.
Our work is related to the literature on managerial career concerns initiated by Fama (1980) and Holmström (1982) . Fama (1980) argued that a manager's career concern provides incentives to make optimal decisions over and above the predictions of a static model. Holmström (1982) showed that career concerns are not necessarily su¢cient to align managers' interests with …rms' objectives. This work started a research agenda that has mainly concentrated on how reputational concerns may provide incentives to (partially) solve static ine¢ciencies. 3 Holmström and Ricart i Costa (1986) were among the …rst to analyze the possibly perverse incentives of reputational concerns: "[...] reputation is the source rather than the resolution of incentive problems." 4 Since in our model, without career concerns e¢ciency would be attained in equilibrium, in spirit our work is more closely related to research in this latter direction.
Our work also relates to research on the impact of career concerns on managerial attitudes towards investment. Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992) , Kanodia, Bushman and Dickhaut (1989) and Zwiebel (1995) , among others, have argued, that career concerns result in managerial conservatism and therefore, in systematic underinvestment. Other authors have maintained that career concerns lead to excessive risk taking or overinvestment (see, e.g., Ricart i Costa (1988), or Holmström and Ricart i Costa (1986), for su¢ciently low risk aversion). Prendergast and Stole (1996) have argued that managers tend to be prone to exaggeration in the beginning of their careers and to conservatism at the end. Our result is that in the beginning of a manager's career his attitude to investment depends on his initial reputation: when his initial reputation is bad, overinvestment arises, for intermediate values underinvestment results, while a manager with a su¢ciently good initial reputation takes e¢cient investment decisions.
This paper shares the view of another strand of literature, including Jeon (1998) and Kanodia, Bushman and Dickhaut (1989) , that focuses on forecasting as the main input provided by managers and the desire to build a reputation for accuracy as the source of the agency problem in an asymmetric information setting. Our work di¤ers from theirs, and in fact from virtually all of the literature on career concerns, in that it takes into account the possibility of contingent compensation to provide explicit incentives to either reinforce or counterbalance the implicit incentives provided by career concerns. 5 Our results also provide implications on the relationship between managerial pay and measures of …rm performance and our contributions are best understood in relationship to existing work by Gibbons and Murphy (1992) and Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) . Gibbons and Murphy (1992) see career concerns as providing managers with incentives to work hard in the early stages of their careers. Given managers are risk averse, making compensation responsive to random performance is costly and an extensive use of contingent compensation is made only when necessary, i.e., in the late stages of a manager's career, when the incentives provided by career concerns are fading. The implication of this is that the pay-performance sensitivity increases as retirement approaches.
Our paper is an attempt to show that, while career concerns may be responsible for the increase in pay-performance sensitivity, the reasons behind this may be altogether di¤erent. We show that competition ensures that pay is monotonic in performance in the second period, and we view career concerns as creating perverse incentives that require nonmonotonic pay schedules in the early stages of a manager's career.
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) study the relationship between pay of US top executives and their …rms' performance and in particular focus on how the pay-performance sensitivity varies 4 Holmström and Ricart i Costa (1986), page 837, fn. 2. Similar arguments have been defended by several other authors and notably by Ricart i Costa, (1988, 1989 ), Kanodia, Bushman, Dickhaut (1989), Sharfstein and Stein (1990) , Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992) , Prendergast (1993) , Zwiebel (1995) , Prendergast and Stole (1996) , Jeon (1998) , and Morris (2001) . 5 Some of the previously mentioned papers do allow for the possibility of current compensation being contingent on current performance but restrict the way in which this can happen, by linking current compensation linearly to current pro…ts as in Gibbons and Murphy (1992) , Prendergast and Stole (1996) and Kanodia, Bushman and Dickhaut (1989) . Prendergast (1993) is the only notable exception in considering the possibility of making compensation contingent on current performance to create incentives to exert forecasting e¤ort. Since this is seen to create incentives to misreport the …ndings, however, mechanism design in Prendergast (1993) is the solution to the shirking problem but also the source of a problem of dishonest reporting.
with the variance of …rms' pro…ts. Their work is motivated by a classical principal-agent model in which a risk averse manager is given incentives to exert high e¤ort through a contract that makes his pay linearly dependent on his …rm's pro…t. Managerial risk aversion implies that the slope of the optimal contract is decreasing in the variance of …rm's pro…t, a prediction validated by their empirical analysis.
Our second numerical exercise shows that the joint distribution of salaries and pro…ts generated by our model is in line with Aggarwal and Samwick's (1999) empirical …ndings in that the payperformance sensitivity is decreasing in the variance of …rms' pro…ts, but our model proposes a di¤erent explanation for this regularity. Competition ensures that managers with a high reputation at the end of their careers are o¤ered contracts with salary payments that are very sensitive to performance. Because these managers also generate low variances of pro…ts, a negative association between …rms' pro…t variances and pay-performance sensitivity arises. 6 In this sense our results question the direction of causality maintained in the empirical studies (from variance to payperformance sensitivity) and propose a new standpoint on the problem.
The main contributions of this paper derive from its focus on contingent compensation. On one side we verify that the perverse incentives of career concerns are robust to the introduction of contingent contracting. On the other we are able to characterize the impact of contingent contracting on equilibrium outcomes, and in particular, on investment decisions and on the link between managerial pay and …rms' performance.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 introduces the equilibrium concept used in the paper. Section 4 o¤ers a characterization of the equilibrium. Section 5 studies the implications of our analysis on the link between managerial pay and …rms' performance measures. Section 6 concludes.
The Model
All …rms are risk neutral and each has an investment project available which has a revenue of z > 0 with probability p, and 0 with probability 1 ¡ p. We normalize the cost of the investment project to 1 and assume that the investment project is ex-ante pro…table, pz ¡ 1 > 0. 7 Firms have available ex-ante identical investment projects.
Managers are risk neutral 8 and live for two periods, t = 1; 2. Each manager has an innate ability to forecast the realization of a given investment project. If employed, a manager only has to decide whether to invest (I) or not (N) in the project available to the …rm. 9 In focusing on investment decisions only, we subscribe to the widely held view that "[i]n a managerial context [...] e¤ort is only part of the overall incentive problem" and that it is more important to "worry about how e¤ective [...] managers are at making decisions". 10 6 Unlike the classical literature that sees …rms' pro…ts variance as exogenous and independent of the manager, we assume that all …rms are ex-ante identical but the distribution of net pro…ts and, therefore, their variance depends on the type of the manager-both directly, through his forecasting ability, and indirectly, through his equilibrium investment decisions. 7 Qualitatively similar results are obtained in the case in which pz ¡ 1 < 0. 8 Since risk neutrality makes the manager indi¤erent among contracts with the same expected value, many di¤erent equilibrium contracts will exist. For this reason, in section 4.2.2 we focus on the minimum variance contract that is arbitrarily close to the contract that would be preferred by a manager with an arbitrarily low degree of risk aversion. 9 A more realistic description would be one in which the manager has to decide whether to invest in a safe or risky project. We have chosen not to depart from the typical description in the literature. As is clear, this alternative interpretation only requires mechanical rewording.
1 0 Holmström and Ricart-i-Costa (1986), page 835.
For simplicity, we assume that only two types of managers exist, good and bad, ¿ 2 fG; Bg. A good manager is always able to forecast the realization of the investment project, whereas a bad manager is never able to do so. Thus, before making the decision to invest or not a manager receives a signal ¾ 2 fV; L; H g, where V is interpreted as a void signal and L and H as the low and high signal, respectively. The probability of the project having the high return (z > 0) conditional on the received signal will be
In other words, while signals H and L ensure, respectively, the success or the failure of the investment project, the void signal, V , provides no additional information and the conditional probability of success is, therefore, equal to the prior, p. 11 A good manager receives signal H with probability p, and L with probability 1¡ p, whereas a bad manager gets signal V with probability 1. At the beginning of the …rst period there is no asymmetric information about a manager's type so that a given manager is commonly believed to be good with probability ¹ and bad with probability 1 ¡ ¹. Once a manager is employed, however, he either gets signal H or L or he gets signal V and in this way he learns his type with probability 1.
We denote the observable …nal outcome of the investment process at date t = 1; 2, by P t 2 fN; F; Sg, where N indicates that no investment took place and F and S indicate that the investment was carried out and it was, respectively, a failure or a success. An investment action pro…le for a manager at date t is a vector
where i t V , i t L , and i t H denote the decision to invest (I) or not (N) at date t = 1; 2 when the signal received by the manager is respectively V , L, or H .
Firms o¤er one-period contracts to managers. Given one of the main goals of this paper is to show that reputational concerns generate e¢ciency losses, we consider contracts that are contingent on the realization of the investment project, P t 2 fN; F; Sg. This seems important, as it guarantees that these losses are robust to the introduction of optimal contracting. A contract is therefore a triple w t = ¡ w t N ; w t F ; w t S ¢ , with the constraint that no salary can be negative, w P t¸0, P t 2 fN; F; Sg, t = 1; 2. 12 In other words, while we only allow short run contracts, we allow salary payments to be made after the realization of the investment process and we therefore introduce the possibility for compensation to depend also on contemporaneous measures of performance.
Given contracts are short run and the investment projects are serially independent, …rms' time horizons are irrelevant and they can be treated as short-run pro…t maximizers. Managers live for two periods and they maximize their expected discounted lifetime salary
where ¹ 2 = E £ ¹ j P 1 ¤ is the probability of the manager being good in period 2 conditional upon the realization of the investment process at time 1, P 1 , and where ± 2 R + is the discount factor. 13 1 1 Managers with high ability are often described in the literature as being able to generate high expected return investment projects, i.e., as being able to come up with good ideas. In contrast to this, we refer to managerial ability as the ability to forecast the realization of a given project: all investment projects are drawn from the same distribution, regardless of the manager's ability, but di¤erent managers may have di¤erent abilities to forecast their realizations. 1 2 We use superscripts for time indices and subscripts for realizations of random variables. 1 3 While this is not important for our results, we also allow cases in which ± > 1, as they can represent situations in which the factor of growth of the scale of the second period investment project with respect to the …rst period one more than compensates the manager's time preference factor.
We …nally make the assumption that a …rm can function without a manager, but that in this case it will get signal V with probability 1. Given investment projects are assumed to be ex-ante pro…table, investing is the optimal decision for a …rm with no manager (and therefore, without a signal on the pro…tability of the investment project). This implies that a …rm with no manager gets an expected pro…t of pz ¡1. 14 For managers to care about their reputation, it is necessary to assume that they appropriate at least part of their reputational rents. For this to happen we need to assume that they are scarce. To simplify notation and wording in the paper we will consider the case in which two …rms compete for every single manager. In particular, we assume that every manager is o¤ered at most a countable set of contracts of the form ¡ w t N ; w t F ; w t S ¢ 2 R 3 + by each …rm and chooses one contract (if any) out of them. All our results generalize to the case in which the measure of the set of managers is lower than the measure of the set of …rms and …rms are allowed to make o¤ers to all managers. 15 In the following we summarize the extensive form of the game.
1. Period 1.
N Nature chooses the type of manager, G with probability ¹ and B with probability 1¡¹, and (independently) the realization of the investment project, S with probability p and F with probability 1 ¡ p. F Without observing nature's choices, each of the two …rms competing for a given manager (commonly known to be good with probability ¹) o¤ers him at most a countable set of contracts, each of them of the form
Without observing nature's choices, the manager either accepts an o¤er or rejects them all.
R If the manager rejects all o¤ers, play restarts at the beginning of period 2.
A If the manager accepts an o¤er, he is hired.
¾ The manager receives a signal, ¾ 1 2 fV; L; H g. i The manager decides whether to invest or not in the given project, i 2 fI; N g. P The manager's play and the realization of the investment project in case the manager decided to invest are observed, P 1 2 fN; F; Sg. The …rm pays the manager a salary according to the contract accepted by the manager.
2. Period 2 has the same structure as period 1 with one exception. Given that the type of the manager is the same in both periods, having observed ¾ 1 in period 1, the manager knows his type when he considers whether to accept any second period o¤er, while …rms do not have access to this information. Second period realization of the investment project is independent of the …rst period one.
We now discuss our modeling choices and the consequences of making di¤erent assumptions. The assumption that no long term contracts are available is necessary for our results. If a long term binding contract were feasible at the beginning of a manager's working life, when no asymmetric information exists, it would be possible to design it in such a way that managers have 1 4 The qualitative nature of the results of the paper would not change if we made the assumption that the reservation level for the …rm is 0 rather than pz ¡ 1, i.e., if we assumed that a manager is an essential input in the production process. 1 5 In this case …rms are allowed to o¤er di¤erent countable sets of contracts to managers with di¤erent beginning of period probabilities of being good. no incentives to distort their investment decisions away from the optimum. We rule out such binding contracts, as the information revealed after the …rst period creates incentives for at least one of the parties to break the contract.
In this paper we consider a screening model, i.e., a situation in which the uninformed party (…rms) make o¤ers. Our results are not sensitive to this choice. In a previous version of this paper, Caruana and Celentani (1999), we studied the same problem in a signaling setting, i.e., in the case in which the informed party (the manager) makes contract o¤ers. In this case the sets of accepted contracts and equilibrium path investment actions are the same as in the present paper as long as the second period continuation equilibria (i) satisfy full extraction of the surplus by the manager, (ii) are Pareto optimal in terms of the investment action pro…le played on the equilibrium path, and (iii) survive the intuitive criterion. An alternative formulation of a signaling environment is one in which, in the spirit of Maskin and Tirole (1992) , the manager o¤ers a menu of contracts, the …rm accepts or rejects the menu, and …nally the manager chooses one contract out of the previously proposed (and accepted) set. With this formulation in all equilibria the set of accepted contracts and the equilibrium path investment decisions would be the same as in the present paper.
This paper takes the view that it is important to study the implications of career concerns when asymmetric information on managerial ability exists. We assume that information is initially symmetric and that an asymmetry arises only in the course of the …rst period. We consider this assumption realistic, but it is also important to remark that the equilibrium outcomes of our model also arise when information is asymmetric from the beginning, although in this latter case the set of equilibria is larger.
Strategies and Equilibrium Concept
In each of the two periods, two …rms compete for a manager believed to be good with probability ¹ 2 [0; 1] by o¤ering each at most a countable set of short-run (one period) contracts, w (¹) 2 R 3 + , conditioning on the public history of the game. In each of the two periods, the manager accepts a contract or none out of the sets of contracts o¤ered to him by the two …rms. If the manager accepts, he receives a private signal on the pro…tability of the project, ¾ t 2 fV; L; Hg. Conditioning on the public and the private history of the game, the manager then decides whether to invest or not in the given project.
Consider a manager who is believed to be good with probability ¹ at the beginning of period 1. His …rst period investment strategy, after having accepted o¤er w 1 , can be denoted as
where i 1
Ng denotes the manager's investment decision conditional on private signal ¾ 1 2 fV; L; H g. Similarly, the manager's second period investment strategy, after having accepted contract w 1 (in period 1), after receiving signal ¾ 1 (in period 1), given P 1 , the outcome of the investment decision process in period 1, and after having accepted the second period o¤er w 2 can be written as i
where i 2 ¾ 2 (: : :) 2 fI; Ng denotes the manager's investment decision conditional on private signal ¾ 2 2 fV; L; H g. Given that no additional use of notation will be made, we choose not to provide a full description of strategies and strategy spaces. Also, for notational convenience we will occasionally omit arguments whenever this cannot cause any confusion.
The equilibrium concept we use is perfect Bayesian equilibrium. To ensure the existence of such equilibria we will assume the following standard tie-breaking rules: (i) whenever indi¤erent between the two investment actions (I and N), the manager will play the one with the higher expected pro…t; (ii) whenever indi¤erent between accepting a contract or rejecting all, the manager will accept a contract.
As will become clear later on, it is possible that in equilibrium certain realizations of the investment process in period 1 are observed with probability 0. Given Bayesian updating is not de…ned after such events, we construct beliefs after such zero-probability realizations making the assumption that each type of manager is equally likely to make a mistake in playing his investment strategy.
Equilibrium Characterization
The following Lemma presents two simple results that are useful for the subsequent analysis. Let E [¼ j i; ¹] denote the expected pro…t gross of salary payments as a function of the investment action pro…le i 2 fI; N g 3 and of the beginning of period probability of the manager being good,
Lemma 1
1. On the equilibrium path i t 2 f(I; I; I) ; (N; N; I) ; (I; N; I)g, t = 1; 2.
, for i 2 f(I; I; I) ; (N; N; I)g :
Proof. For part 1 suppose that in equilibrium a …rst period o¤er w 1 is made such that Because w 1 2 R 3 + and given the expected gross pro…t from i = 2 f(I; I; I) ; (N; N; I) ; (I; N; I)g is strictly less than pz ¡ 1 > 0, the net expected payo¤ to the …rm o¤ering this contract is strictly less than pz ¡ 1 > 0. Given a …rm with no manager earns pz ¡ 1 > 0, withdrawing all o¤ers is a pro…table deviation for the …rm and a contradiction arises. The same arguments applies for second period o¤ers. Parts 2 and 3 are established through straightforward computations.
Part 1 of Lemma 1 establishes that the investment action pro…le played on the equilibrium path in any of the two periods has to be one of (I; I; I), (N; N; I), or (I; N; I). Part 2 states that, among the three previous investment action pro…les, (I; N; I) always generates the highest expected pro…t gross of salary payments. Part 3 …nally establishes (1) as a necessary and su¢cient condition for the expected pro…t gross of salary payments generated by (N; N; I) to be no lower than the one generated by (I; I; I).
With Lemma 1 we proceed to subsection 4.1 which solves for second period continuation equilibria. In subsection 4.2, we then move back to the …rst period and characterize the equilibrium path investment decisions and managerial contracts.
Second Period
At the beginning of the second period the manager has already privately learned his type. Let ¹ 2 2 [0; 1] denote the …rms' (posterior) probability assessment that he is the good manager. 16 The following Proposition characterizes second period continuation equilibria.
Proposition 1 Assume that at the beginning of period 2 …rms believe that the manager is good with probability ¹ 2 2 [0; 1]. Then, in any continuation equilibrium:
1. The unique contract which is accepted by both types of managers is:
2. The investment action pro…le played by the manager on the equilibrium path is:
Proof. Appendix. Proposition 1 analyzes the impact of asymmetric information on second period continuation equilibria and shows that they are 1. Pooling: A manager that is believed to be good with probability ¹ 2 at the beginning of period 2 will accept o¤er w 2 (¹ 2 ) regardless of whether he is in fact good or bad.
E¢cient:
On the equilibrium path the manager plays the e¢cient investment action pro…le.
To see why second period continuation equilibria are e¢cient, note that competition for managers tends to lead to surplus maximization (e¢ciency). In the manager's second period of life, his last, nothing counters this tendency to e¢ciency as the manager's only incentives are the explicit ones provided by the contract he accepts.
To see that second period continuation equilibria are pooling it is necessary to show that o¤ers that are more attractive to a good manager are not pro…table deviations for the …rms. The following argument will show that this is the case because, once the incentive compatibility constraints are kept into account, the indi¤erence curves of the two types of managers do not intersect, and o¤ers that are preferred by a good manager are also preferred by a bad manager.
Without loss of generality assume …rst that w 2 F (¹ 2 ) = 0 17 and consider pairs Figure 1 depicts the indi¤erence curves for the good and the bad manager in that space keeping into account their incentive compatibility constraints. Given that in the second period the incentives are simply determined by explicit compensation, it is easy to see that so long as w S¸wN (i.e., below the 45 degree line) the typical indi¤erence curve for the good manager is the negatively sloped line represented as U G as a good manager's expected utility is pw S +(1 ¡ p) w N (if w S < w N the manager would always refrain from investing and his utility would be w N ). The typical indi¤erence curve for the bad manager instead is like the kinked line represented as U B : Above line (IC) (i.e., whenever pw 2 S (¹ 2 ) < w 2 N (¹ 2 )) a bad manager chooses not to invest and gets w N , whereas below line (IC) (i.e., when pw 2 S (¹ 2 )¸w 2 N (¹ 2 )) he chooses to invest and gets pw S . In equilibrium managers fully extract their expected value and thus …rms only make pz ¡ 1 in expected terms. In Figure 1 we represent the condition ensuring this as the broken double line (FE). Given this, it is easy to verify that any contract on (FE) but di¤erent from the intersection …rms may in fact also learn his type from …rst period play, as shown by Lemma 2, below. In other words, there are cases in which in equilibrium ¹ 2 is either 0 or 1.
1 7 By this we mean that (i) in equilibrium w 2 F (¹ 2 ) = 0 has to hold and (ii) if no pro…table deviation with w 2 F (¹ 2 ) = 0 from a proposed equilibrium exists, then no pro…table deviation exists at all. of lines (IC) and the rightmost part of (FE) is such that a pro…table deviation for a …rm exists (attracting only good managers), whereas no such deviation exists for the contract at that intersection. It is easy to check that this last contract is the one mentioned in Proposition 1, 18 and the result follows.
An interesting implication of Proposition 1 is that equilibrium wages are increasing in gross pro…t as they are highest when the outcome is success, intermediate when the outcome is no investment, and lowest when the outcome is failure. For expositional purposes, Figure 2 depicts w 2 S (¹ 2 ) and w 2 N (¹ 2 ) for the case in which p = :6, a case we will also consider in subsection 4.2.2.
First Period
Consider the continuation game starting after a manager believed to be good with probability ¹ accepts …rst period contract o¤er w
1
. From Proposition 1, and given the tie-breaking rule assumed in section 3, all perfect Bayesian equilibria of this continuation game are identical in …rst period investment strategies and in the distribution over second period accepted contracts.
Let i ¡ w 1 ; ¹ ¢ denote such a …rst period investment strategy and let E £ w 2 ¡ ¹ 2 ¢ j ¿ ¤ be the expected value of the accepted second period contract for a manager of type ¿ 2 fG; Bg who is believed to be good with probability ¹ 2 in the beginning of period 2.
For a …xed w = (w N ; w F ; w S ) 2 R 3 + let E [w j i; ¹] be the expected salary payment when the manager is commonly believed to be good with probability ¹ (at the beginning of the period) and when he plays the investment strategy i.
Since there is no asymmetry of information at the beginning of period 1, and because the two …rms are competing for one manager, by a standard Bertrand pricing argument, o¤ers that will be accepted with positive probability by the manager have to be such that the proposing …rm's expected pro…ts are exactly pz ¡ 1.
19
Given a manager accepts the o¤er that guarantees him the highest lifetime utility, in period 1 the o¤ers that are accepted in equilibrium with positive probability are such that
The objective function is a manager's lifetime expected discounted salary given the fact that both he and the …rm correctly anticipate continuation equilibrium play. In other words, it already incorporates the ex-post incentives that a manager will face after observing his private signal, that is, the reputational consequences of his play. This is taken into account by having the …rst and second period expected salaries conditioned on the prior probability of the manager being good and on the continuation equilibrium investment strategy
The following Lemma provides the probability of the manager being good, conditional on the …rst period investment strategy and the public realization of the …rst period investment process.
Lemma 2 Let w 1 2 R 3 + be given. 1 8 Notice that the contract in Lemma 1 is such that pw
and gives the …rm expected pro…t pz ¡1.
If i
Proof. In the second case ¹ 2 (:) is pinned down by Bayes's rule. In the …rst case (for ¹ 2 (N )) and the third case (for ¹ 2 (F)) this cannot be done. As was remarked in subsection 3 we make the assumption that the two types of players are equally likely to make a mistake in their investment decision. This assumption implies that if i 1 ¡ w 1 ; ¹ ¢ = (I; I; I), then ¹ 2 (N ) = ¹, and if
Lemma 3 uses Proposition 1 and Lemma 2 to compute continuation equilibria payo¤s, a result that simpli…es the computation of the …rst period equilibrium.
Proof. Since we know from Lemma 1 that in any continuation equilibrium we need to consider three di¤erent cases, depending on which of the previous investment strategies is played after a given w 1 2 R 3 + . This can be checked through straightforward calculations using w 2 ¡ ¹ 2 ¢ from Proposition 1 and the posterior probabilities of the manager being good under i 1 ¡ w 1 ; ¹ ¢ 2 f(I; I; I) ; (N; N; I) ; (I; N; I)g provided in Lemma 2.
From Lemma 3, the maximization problem above can be simpli…ed as follows
Thus, the …rst period o¤ers that are accepted are simply those that maximize the manager's …rst period payo¤, because the expected second period payo¤s do not depend on the …rst period accepted o¤er. This is not to say that career concerns do not have an ex-ante-impact, as i 1 ¡ w 1 ; ¹ ¢ does depend on career concerns for any given w 1 2 R 3 + and ¹ 2 (0; 1). In other words, career concerns are important to the extent that they induce the manager ex-post, i.e., once he has observed his private signal and, consequently, learned his type, to make certain investment decisions rather than others. Since di¤erent investment strategies imply di¤erent expected net pro…ts, career concerns do play a role in the manager's …rst period equilibrium accepted o¤er.
First Period Investment Strategies Let
The following proposition provides a complete characterization of the investment action pro…les played on the …rst period equilibrium path. Proof. Appendix. The results of Proposition 2 are depicted in Figure 3 , where, for a given value of p, we plot in the (¹; z) space the investment action pro…le played in the …rst period equilibrium path. Note that Lemma 10 in the Appendix shows that e z (¹) is increasing.
The result of Proposition 2 can be summarized in the following terms. By an equilibrium argument, a manager will always prefer to accept an o¤er that induces him to play the investment action pro…le with the highest surplus. If a nonempty set of o¤ers such that, after accepting any element of the set, the manager will play according to the …rst best pro…le (I; N; I), in equilibrium the manager will accept an o¤er from this set and will then play according to (I; N; I).
Suppose now the previous set is empty and assume that the expected surplus of (N; N; I) is larger than that of (I; I; I). By the same argument as above if a nonempty set of o¤ers exists such that after accepting any element of the set the manager will play according to (N; N; I), in equilibrium the manager will accept an o¤er from this set and will then play according to (N; N; I) (underinvestment). If the previous set is empty, or if the expected surplus of (N; N; I) is smaller than that of (I; I; I), in equilibrium the manager will invest regardless of the signal he gets, (I; I; I) (overinvestment).
Proposition 2 uses the previous arguments to characterize the sets of parameters for which each of the three investment action pro…les described above is played in the …rst period equilibrium path:
1. Suppose a manager plays according to (I; N; I) on the …rst period equilibrium path. The implicit reputational incentives for the bad manager to deviate are decreasing in ¹ and the surplus that can be used to o¤set these reputational incentives through explicit compensation is increasing in ¹ (and is independent of z). As a consequence (I; N; I) can be played in the …rst period in equilibrium only when ¹ is above a given threshold. Proposition 2 provides an explicit calculation of this threshold, ¹ ¤ .
2. Suppose a manager plays according to (I; N; I) on the …rst period equilibrium path. The implicit reputational incentives for the bad manager to deviate are decreasing in ¹ and the surplus that can be used to o¤set these reputational incentives through explicit compensation is increasing in ¹ and decreasing in z. This implies that these reputational incentives can be countered when ¹ is high and z is low, or, in other words, in a region lying below an increasing function on the (¹; z) space, e z (¹). Once again, Proposition 2 provides an explicit calculation of such function, e z (¹). , there are cases in which the …rst period investment strategy played in equilibrium is (I; I ; I ), despite of the fact that it is dominated, not only by (I; N; I) ; but also by (N; N; I).
By part 1 of Proposition 2 if the initial reputation of the manager is su¢ciently good, then in the …rst period the manager will play the e¢cient investment action pro…le. If his initial reputation is not su¢ciently good, then, by parts 2 and 3, over-or underinvestment will occur in equilibrium depending on whether the initial reputation of the manager is bad or intermediate, with the region of underinvestment getting smaller the more pro…table the investment project is in expected terms (the higher z) and eventually disappearing (when z¸e z (¹ ¤ )).
The rest of this section completes the analysis of equilibrium by turning attention to …rst period equilibrium accepted contracts.
Characterization of First Period Contracts
The assumption of managerial risk neutrality implies that many di¤erent …rst period contracts (with the same expected value) can be accepted by the manager in di¤erent equilibria, and that all equilibria are identical in the distribution over investment outcomes and in the expected …rst period payo¤ to the manager and the …rm. Although the objective of the paper is to focus on career concerns alone, the multiplicity of equilibria in …rst period accepted contracts is an arti…cial product of the extreme assumption of risk neutrality. Any arbitrarily small amount of risk aversion would break the tie among all …rst period contracts with the same expected value. Although we do not reproduce the proof here, it is easy to verify that for any sequence of strictly concave utility functions that tend to a linear utility function, the limit optimal contract in a set of contracts with the same expected value is the one that minimizes variance. For this reason, whenever multiple equilibrium accepted contracts exist, in the rest of the paper we focus on the one with the minimum variance.
To provide an intuition about the results we will consider a numerical example in which we will assume that ± = 1, p = :6, and z = 1:7. The qualitative nature of the results for this example can be veri…ed to be independent of the parameter values.
First and second period equilibrium contracts are plotted against the beginning of period probability of the manager being good in Figures 4 and 2 , respectively. 21 Notice that in this case z < e z (¹ ¤ ), so that there are managers of ex ante types ¹ such that case 2 of Proposition 2 (underinvestment) arises.
As Figure 4 shows, there are three di¤erent regions of …rst period contracts, each corresponding to one of the three regions mentioned in Proposition 2.
Consider …rst ¹ 2 [0; e ¹), with e ¹ = 0:34145. In this region, the prior probability of a manager being good is too low for a contract to exist, in which …rms break even and the equilibrium investment decisions are di¤erent from i 1 ¡ w 1 ; ¹ ¢ = (I; I; I). The equilibrium contract is therefore w = (0; 0; 0) ; and managerial compensation is constant in …rm performance.
In the second region, corresponding to ¹ 2 [e ¹; ¹ ¤ ), ¹ ¤ = 0:41667, while the manager's prior probability of being good is not su¢cient to have a contract that has …rms break even, and such that the e¢cient investment strategy is played, there is a set of contracts that ensure i 1 ¡ w 1 ; ¹ ¢ = 2 1 While the contracts for the second period can be easily plotted using the results of Lemma 1, the equilibrium contracts for period 1 have been computed by a Matlab program, developed by Ramón Xifré. We use the same program in section 5 below to analyze the aggregate relationship between managerial pay and …rm performance. The program is available upon request from the authors.
(N; N; I). Although by Proposition 2, all such contracts can arise in equilibrium, in Figure 4 we single out the contract that minimizes the variance of compensation. 22 From Figure 4 it is easy to see that for all values of ¹ in this region w N > w S > w F ; so that managerial compensation is not monotonically increasing in …rms' pro…ts. Note that w N > w S to guarantee that the bad manager (who gets the void signal) prefers not to invest despite his unambiguous reputational incentives to invest (from Lemma 2 in this region ¹ 2 (N ) < ¹ 2 (F) and ¹ 2 (N) < ¹ 2 (S)).
In the third region, corresponding to ¹ 2 [¹ ¤ ; 1], the manager's initial reputation is su¢cient for a set of contracts to exist, such that in the continuation equilibrium the manager will play the e¢cient investment strategy, i 1 ¡ w 1 ; ¹ ¢ = (I; N; I). From Figure 4 it is easy to check that in this area w F > w S > w N ; so that, again, managerial compensation is nonmonotonic in …rms' performance. It is easy to verify from Lemma 2 that in this area the expected posterior for a manager who gets the void signal is ¹p when investing, while it is equal to 1 when not investing. This implies that the bad manager has implicit (reputational) incentives not to invest. To counterbalance these implicit incentives, the contract has to satisfy w F > w N ; as to ensure that the (bad) manager who gets the void signal makes the e¢cient decision to invest.
The Link Between Pay and Performance
The goal of this section is to investigate some implications of our results on the link between managerial compensation and …rm performance.
For this purpose we …rst compute the joint probability distribution over salaries and pro…t generated by equilibrium play. As was done in the previous section, we cope with the multiplicity of …rst period equilibrium contracts, by singling out the equilibrium contract with the lowest variance for each value of ¹.
We then turn to the link between pay and performance by performing regression analyses on the equilibrium distribution over salaries and pro…ts. Because we our interested in …nding out whether the equilibrium prediction of our models are consistent with available evidence, we will try to reproduce the econometric analyses of two works on the link between pay and performance, Gibbons and Murphy (1992) and Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) .
In this section we take into account managerial heterogeneity, in the sense that we consider a population of managers with di¤erent prior probabilities of being good in the beginning of their careers. We also take the view that, while a manager and the …rms competing for him know the manager's idiosyncratic ¹, i.e., his idiosyncratic prior probability of being good, the econometrician has no such direct knowledge.
Career Concerns and the Link Between Pay and Performance
In this subsection we analyze the link between pay and performance by considering separately the joint distribution of compensation and pro…t for each of the two periods. 23 We consider pro…ts both net and gross of salary payments. We use each of these distributions to regress salaries on pro…ts and we interpret the resulting OLS coe¢cients as measures of the pay-performance sensitivity. 2 2 Since in this region failure never occurs in equilibrium, the value of wF is in fact irrelevant for the variance of compensation. In Figure 4 we depict the highest wF that satis…es the incentive compatibility constraints, given wS and w N . In other words all values of w F on or below the levels shown in Figure 4 are equivalent both from the point of view of incentives and from the point of view of the variance of managerial compensation. 2 3 Notice that the second period aggregate distribution is computed using the posterior probability of each type of manager's being good in the beginning of period 2 given equilibrium play and equilibrium learning about his type.
To check the robustness of our results we have repeated the above computations for many di¤erent initial distributions of ¹ given by di¤erent Beta distributions, Be(®;¯), with di¤erent values for the parameters ® and¯. Given the qualitative results are the same for all distributions, in this subsection, as well as in the following one, we will report our results on only four di¤erent distributions representing a uniform distribution (® =¯= 1), two skewed distributions (® = 3, = 1:5, right skewed, and ® = 1:5,¯= 3, left skewed) and a symmetric distribution with a lower variance than the uniform distribution (® =¯= 3). Figure 5 provides the plots of densities for each of these four cases.
The computations to be presented below are performed for the same parameter speci…cation used in the example in subsection 4.2.2 above. The qualitative nature of the results have been veri…ed to be the same for all the other parameter speci…cations that we have considered.
The …rst and second column of Table 1 report the OLS coe¢cients for, respectively, …rst and second period when salaries are regressed on pro…ts gross of salary payments and show that the magnitude of the pay-performance sensitivity is always higher in the second period than in the …rst. 24 The third and fourth column of Table 1 report the OLS coe¢cients for …rst and second period when salaries are regressed on pro…ts net of salary payments. The results on the relative magnitude of the pay-performance sensitivity in the …rst and the second period are preserved although the pay-performance sensitivity in the …rst period is now negative.
To perform comparisons with empirical studies that use changes in …rms' stock market valuations the appropriate measure would seem to be pro…ts net of salary payments because …rms' market valuations should discount the cost of managerial compensation. Despite this observation, we regard the results for the case of pro…ts gross of salary payments as more interesting for the following reason. As was mentioned in section 2, for managers to care about their reputation it is necessary that they appropriate at least part of their reputational rents. For the sake of simplicity, our model makes the extreme assumption that competition ensures that a manager appropriates all his reputational rents. This implies that in our model, unlike in reality, a manager's compensation package may be sizable with respect to the …rm's pro…t, 25 so that managerial compensation may even reverse the relative orderings of pro…t realizations. In other words, we believe that the negative coe¢cients in the regressions of …rst period salaries and net pro…ts are an arti…cial consequence of the disproportionate relative size of managerial compensation to …rms' pro…ts and we therefore focus our attention on the relationship between salaries and pro…ts gross of managerial compensation. 26 The results reported in Table 1 are in line with Gibbons and Murphy's (1992) empirical …nding that the sensitivity of managerial pay to …rm performance increases as retirement nears. Gibbons and Murphy's (1992) theoretical explanation for this result is that as retirement nears stronger explicit (compensation) incentives are needed to substitute the fading implicit (reputational) incentives. The reason behind the same result in our model is, however, completely di¤erent and will be discussed in the following.
The di¤erence between the joint distributions of salaries and pro…ts in the …rst and the second 2 4 We also computed pay-performance elasticities and pay-performance correlations and found that the values of the coe¢cients are always larger in the second period than in the …rst. 2 5 Many empirical studies have documented the fact that CEO's compensation packages are very small in comparison to …rms' changes of value. 2 6 This idea can be formalized as follows. Suppose that the regression coe¢cient with pro…ts gross of salary payments is positive and the one with pro…ts net of salary payments is negative. If managerial salaries w are multiplied by a constant ·, then it is easy to show that for a su¢ciently low value of · the regression coe¢cient with pro…ts net of salary payments is also positive.
period depends on two main factors: (a) Managerial compensation in period 2 is increasing in pro…t but is nonmonotonic in period 1 (see Figures 2 and 4) ; (b) As time goes by, …rms get additional information about managers and update their estimates of their abilities. This suggests that the di¤erence between pay-performance sensitivity in the …rst and the second period could be decomposed into two e¤ects : the career concerns e¤ect arising because of (a) and the learning e¤ect due to (b). Because learning in our model is sometimes rather extreme-at the end of the …rst period it is learned that some managers are good and some bad with probability 1-it is important to assess the contribution of each of these e¤ects to the overall result to ensure it is not driven by these somewhat extreme assumptions. To do so, we performed the same exercise in the second period but, instead of using the posterior distribution over ¹ generated by equilibrium play and learning, we used the prior distributions (as in Figure 5 )-thus shutting down the learning e¤ect. The resulting slopes (not reported here) are very close to the slopes reported in Table 1 , but in fact between 4.5% and 8.3% higher than them. The implication of this is that in these cases the learning e¤ect is not very sizable in absolute terms, but in fact it is also negative: Keeping equilibrium learning into account does not increase the slope for the second period, it reduces it. Given this, the di¤erence in compensation schedules, the career concern e¤ect, emerges as the driving force behind the increasing pay-performance sensitivity. 27 
Risk and Executive Compensation
The relationship between executive pay and …rm performance has been the object of extensive research. Holmström and Milgrom (1987) studied the optimal compensation schedule for a repeated agency problem and found that, under appropriate conditions, it is linear in …rm performance and that its slope is decreasing in the variance of pro…ts, which is equal to the (exogenous) variance of a …rm speci…c error term. To test this prediction Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) propose the following speci…cation as an approximation of the optimal contract:
Subindices i, j, and t refer, respectively, to the executive, the …rm and the period, w ijt is the executive's compensation, ¼ jt is the return to shareholders, F ³ ¾ 2 jt´i s the (cumulative) distribution function of the variance of returns of the …rm,¸t is a year e¤ect, and " it is the error term. The pay-performance sensitivity for a manager working for a …rm with variance ¾ 2 jt is°1 +°2F
and this speci…cation makes it is easy to compute the pay-performance sensitivity at any percentile of the distribution of variances. For example, the pay-performance sensitivities of the managers working for the …rm with the lowest, median, and highest variances are, respectively,°1 ,°1 + 0:5°2, and°1 +°2. The prediction of the standard principal-agent model is that°1 > 0 and°2 < 0 (°1 +°2 > 0). In other words, while higher performance leads to higher compensation, the e¤ect of returns on compensation will be smaller at …rms with more variable returns. The classical principal-agent model makes no clear prediction about the relationship between variance of returns and the level of compensation (as opposed to the slope of the pay-performance schedule), but Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) also introduce°3F ³ ¾ 2 jt´t o make sure that their estimates of°2 "are not a¤ected by any relationship between the variance and the level of compensation that may happen to exist in the cross section." 29 Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) estimate the above equation using US data for 1993-96. Wages are de…ned to be yearly dollar compensations to CEO's (in thousands of dollars) and returns as yearly dollar returns to …rms (in millions of dollars). To compute the variances of returns for each individual …rm they use monthly data observations of stock returns in the previous 60 months. Their main results on the relationship between pay-performance sensitivity and variance of …rm returns are presented in column 1 of their Table 3 where they provide the median regression estimates of the coe¢cient in the above speci…cation:°1 = 27:596,°2 = ¡26:147. 30 Both coe¢cients are signi…cantly di¤erent from 0 and are consistent with the predictions of the standard principal-agent model: the estimated pay-performance sensitivities of the managers working for the …rm with the lowest, median, and highest variances turn out to be, respectively,°1 = 27:596°1 + 0:5°2 = 14:5225°1 +°2 = 1:449:
To verify whether our model is consistent with Aggarwal and Samwick's (1999) results we estimate the coe¢cients of the same speci…cation as in (2) using the joint distribution of salaries, pro…ts and theoretical pro…t variances generated by our model. Because Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) do not take into account the numbers of years before retirement, we use the average of the joint distributions for the …rst and the second period, thereby implicitly assuming that half of the managers are in the early stage of their career (period 1) and the other half in their …nal stage (period 2) with the idea that two overlapping generations of managers live at the same date.
31
Since we only consider one date, we ignore the year e¤ect,¸t. Finally, given our compensation realizations do not exhibit the same outliers as the data we compute OLS estimates of the coe¢cients.
As in the previous subsection, to check the robustness of our results we have repeated the above computations for many di¤erent initial distributions of ¹ given by di¤erent Beta distributions, Be(®;¯), with di¤erent values for the parameters ® and¯. Given the results are qualitatively the same for all distributions, we report our results only for the same four di¤erent distributions considered in the previous subsection (see Figure 5) . Our results for these cases are summarized in Table 2 : As in Aggarwal and Samwick (1999),°1 is positive and°2 negative; 32 Table 2 also provides the pay-performance sensitivities for the managers who are employed by the …rm with the lowest, median, and largest variance in the population.
Since the pay-performance sensitivity is in fact decreasing in the (theoretical) variance of …rm returns, our model turns out to be observationally equivalent to the standard principal-agent model and the documented relationship between risk and pay-performance sensitivity may be due to reasons di¤erent from the ones put forward by it. Figures 6 and 7 show the variance of pro…ts of a …rm as a function of its manager's age and beginning of period probability of being good. When a manager is in his …rst period and has a low initial value of ¹ the variance of gross pro…t is maximal ( Figure 6 ) and his pay does not depend on realized pro…t at all (w N = w F = w S = 0, Figure 4 ). For both intermediate and higher values of ¹, the variance of pro…t will be lower ( Figure 6 ) and his pay will depend on pro…ts but in a nonmonotonic way (Figure 4) . While the …rst observation seems to contribute to a negative association of pay-performance sensitivity and variance, the second has an unclear e¤ect.
Consider now a manager in his second period. From Figure 2 it is easy to see that both w S ¡w N and w N ¡ w F are increasing in ¹. 33 Given pro…t realizations (before salaries) are independent of ¹, the previous observation clari…es that in the second period a manager's pay-performance sensitivity is increasing in ¹, his beginning of period probability of being good. Figure 7 shows, on the other hand, that the variance of pro…ts is decreasing in the same probability so that a negative association between pay-performance sensitivity and pro…t variance arises.
The previous arguments suggest that the negative association between pay-performance sensitivity and variance of pro…ts is mainly due to the compensation patterns of heterogeneous managers in the late stages of their careers. This intuition is con…rmed by the fact that running similar regressions for managers in their …rst and second period separately, the results we have presented are con…rmed (and in fact magni…ed in absolute terms) for managers in their second period, but are unclear for managers in their …rst period.
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) also show that omitting variances (i.e., imposing°2 =°3 = 0) leads to an estimate of the pay-performance sensitivity of 3.47 (a result in line with Jensen and Murphy's (1990) …ndings) as opposed to a pay-performance sensitivity at the median variance of 14.52. We performed a similar exercise and also found that in this case the pay-performance sensitivities are lower than the corresponding estimates of pay-performance sensitivities at the median variance reported in Table 2 .
The previous discussion shows that the data generated by our model is consistent with the empirical evidence. Our results therefore suggest that the correlation between variance of pro…ts and pay-performance sensitivity might be spurious in the sense that it could be the consequence of (unobserved) heterogeneity of managerial skills. At a more general level, while we are convinced about the merits of the interpretation proposed by the standard principal-agent theory, we believe that our results provide a possibly complementary explanation of the relationship between risk and executive compensation.
Conclusion
In this paper we study a situation in which a manager's preoccupation for his career creates a discrepancy between his interests and those of the …rm. We show that the existence of asymmetric information on managers' abilities to forecast the realization of investment projects is su¢cient to create this divergence. In the context of a two-period model we study the way and the extent to which this divergence can be solved using explicit compensations schemes. Allowing salaries to depend on contemporaneous performance is not always su¢cient to induce managers to make e¢cient investment decisions in the early stages of their careers. When the initial reputation of the manager is bad, exaggeration (overinvestment) arises, for intermediate values of initial reputation, conservatism (underinvestment) results, while the e¢cient investment decisions are taken in equilibrium only when the initial reputation of the manager is su¢ciently good.
We characterize equilibrium contracts and show that the asymmetry of information on man-agers' abilities has very di¤erent impacts at di¤erent stages of a manager's career. While second period compensation is monotonically increasing in performance, the asymmetry of information creates perverse incentives in the …rst period (career concerns) that can be (partially) amended only through nonmonotonic pay schemes. To investigate some of the implications of our results, we have carried out two numerical exercises that study the link between pay and performance generated by our model.
In our …rst exercise we …nd that the pay-performance sensitivity in the second period of a manager's career is larger than in the …rst. We argue that this increase is due to the career concern e¤ect that arises because of the divergence between …rst and second period compensation schemes and implies a more direct link between pay and performance in the second period, when pay is monotonic in performance, than in the …rst, when it is not. The result is supported by the increase in pay-performance elasticity of CEOs of large US companies in their …nal years of employment documented by Gibbons and Murphy (1992) . Our model therefore provides an alternative explanation for this empirical …nding.
Our second exercise analyzes the relationship between risk and executive compensation. Standard principal-agent models with managerial risk aversion imply that a lower pay-performance sensitivity is an optimal response to an increase in the exogenous variance of pro…ts. Aggarwal and Samwick's (1999) empirical …ndings have given support to this view.
Our results also imply that the pay-performance sensitivity is positive but decreasing in the variance of …rm's pro…ts. Our work is, therefore, also in line with Aggarwal and Samwick's (1999) …ndings but it suggests that the negative association between risk and pay-performance sensitivity could also arise because the managers with the highest pay-performance sensitivities are the ones who generate the lowest variance of pro…ts. Since the two models are observationally equivalent in this dimension, we see our result as an alternative or possibly complementary explanation for this empirical regularity.
Our model can produce a number of additional testable predictions that can shed light on the intratemporal and intertemporal relationships among managerial compensation and measures of …rm performance, such as investment or pro…t. We believe that our results provide an encouraging …rst step in this direction.
A Appendix

A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We will prove a sequence of claims. 2. If a pooling equilibrium exists it has to be such that …rms's expected pro…ts are exactly pz ¡ 1. If …rms's expected pro…ts were less than pz ¡ 1 a pro…table deviation for them would be to withdraw all o¤ers and invest on their own, which gives an expected pro…t of pz ¡ 1. Let (¼ 1 ; ¼ 2 ) denote the expected equilibrium payo¤s to …rms 1 and 2, suppose max (¼ 1 ; ¼ 2 ) > pz¡1 and suppose, without loss of generality, that
. Let e w = ( e w N ; e w F ; e w S ) denote the o¤er made by …rm 1 and that is accepted with positive probability by the manager. Then, it is straightforward to recognize that there is an " > 0, such that b w = ( e w N + "; e w F + "; e w S + ") is a pro…table deviation for …rm 2 as b w is strictly preferred for all " > 0 and there is an " > 0 such that the expected pro…t to …rm 2 is strictly larger than ¼ 2 .
3. If a pooling equilibrium exists it has to be such that the e¢cient investment strategy is played.
Suppose this is not the case and let (w N ; w F ; w S ) denote the o¤er which is accepted by both types of manager. Suppose that after having accepted (w N ; w F ; w S ) the manager does not play according to(I; N; I). From Lemma 1 he will play either (I; I; I) or (N; N; I):
(a) Suppose the manager plays (I; I; I). This implies that (w N ; w F ; w S ) = (0; 0; 0). Consider (w
). This o¤er is strictly preferred by both types of managers, and since after accepting this o¤er the manager would play (I; N; I), the expected pro…t to the …rm would be pz ¡ 1 + ", a contradiction (b) Suppose the manager plays (N; N; I). This implies that w N > pw S + (1 ¡ p) w F . Consider now an alternative o¤er (w 0 N ; w 0 F ; w 0 S ) = (w N ¡ ®; 0; w S + ") with " 2
"´. It is easy to check that such an o¤er is strictly preferred only by the good manager and it would yield expected gross pro…ts of p (z ¡ 1 ¡ w 0 S )¡(1¡p)w 0 N which, for " su¢ciently small, can be shown to be larger than ¹p (z ¡ 1 ¡ w S ) ¡ (1 ¡ ¹p)w N . Therefore, (w 0 N ; w 0 F ; w 0 S ) would be a pro…table deviation and a contradiction arises.
4. If a pooling equilibrium exists, the o¤er accepted by both types of managers is such that w F = 0. Recall from 3 above that, if a pooling equilibrium exists it has to be such that the e¢cient investment action pro…le is played. Suppose, contrary to the claim that the o¤er accepted in equilibrium by both types of manager, w = (w N ; w F ; w S ) is such that w F > 0. Consider another o¤er b w = ( b w N ; b w F ; b w S ) = (w N ; 0; w S + ") : It is easy to recognize that there is an " > 0 such that b w is strictly preferred only by the good manager and that gives an expected payo¤ to the …rm strictly larger than pz ¡ 1, a contradiction.
5. No equilibrium can exist in which both managers accept an o¤er di¤erent from
From 2-4 above we know that if a pooling equilibrium exists, it is such that the manager plays the e¢cient investment action pro…le, such that …rms' expected pro…ts are pz ¡ 1 and such that the accepted o¤er is such that w F = 0. Given this if a pooling equilibrium exists the accepted o¤er (w N ; 0; w S ) 2 R 3 + has to be such that pw S¸wN (3)
The thick segment on Figure 8 depicts the contracts that satisfy all previous conditions. The lines (IC) and (FE) correspond to the conditions (3) and (4) . Notice that their intersection lies on ¡ w 6. There exists an equilibrium in which both types of manager accept o¤er
First notice that if w S¸wN a good manager invests e¢ciently and gets utility pw S + (1 ¡ p) w N , so that for all contracts below the 45 degree line his indi¤erence curve is like the negatively sloped line Figure 1 . Consider now the bad manager. Since the bad manager invests if and only if pw S¸wN , i.e., if the contract he accepts is below the (IC) line, his utility below the (IC) line will be w S and above it will be w N so that his indi¤erence curve will be like the kinked line in Figure 1 .
Consider now the indi¤erence curves of the two types of manager passing through the contract mentioned in the claim (at the intersection of the rightmost part of (FE) and (IC) as in Figure 1 ). Suppose that a pro…table deviation for a …rm exists that attracts only the good manager. This means that there is a contract below the 45 degree line, above the indi¤erence curve for the good manager and below the indi¤erence curve for the bad manager. From Figure 1 it is easy to see that if the good manager prefers a contract to µ ¹ 2 (1 ¡ p)
the bad manager will too and a contradiction is obtained. Suppose now that a pro…table deviation exists that attracts both types of manager. It is easy to see that any contract preferred by both types of manager will be above the full extraction condition (FE) and will therefore imply a pro…t less than pz ¡ 1 for the …rm, a contradiction. It is easy to see that no pro…table deviation can exist that attracts only the bad manager, and the claim follows.
From 1-6 the claim of Proposition 1 follows.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
From Proposition 1 the o¤er accepted by the manager in all second period continuation equilibria is:
This implies that expected second period payo¤ for all second period continuation equilibria for a manager of type ¿ = G; B, given that the perceived probability that he is good conditional on the history at the end of the …rst period is ¹ 2 , will be:
Given these preliminaries we will now prove Proposition 2 through a series of Lemmas. Given all second period continuation equilibria are payo¤ equivalent, all the statements to be proved are valid for all continuation equilibria and therefore no explicit reference to second period continuation equilibria will be made. Proof. Suppose that there exists a w 1 2 R 3 + such that i 1 ¡ w 1 ; ¹ ¢ = (I; N; I). This means that
It is easy to see that (5)- (8) hold for all z¸1 p as they are independent of z. Now consider ¹ 0 > ¹ and note that ¹ appears only in (5), (7), and (8). Totally di¤erentiating (8) with respect to w 1 S and ¹ and rearranging we get
with the inequality following from the fact that, by (8) and non-negativity of salaries, w 1 N · 1. Consider now ¹ 0 > ¹. By (9) one can choose w 10 S > w 1 S such that given
Now it is easy to check that (5)- (7) are also satis…ed, due to the fact that w 10 S > w 1 S and ¹ 0 > ¹ and therefore
:
. From (5) and (7), substituting the full extraction constraint (8), we have
whose only nonnegative solution is w
. It is easy to verify that this solution satis…es (6) . From the full extraction condition we get w 1 S = (1 ¡ p) ± 1+± which concludes the proof. 
A necessary condition for existence of ¡ w (10) and (11) is that w 1 F 2 R + exists that satis…es (10) and (11) for w 1 N = 0. We therefore have
and a necessary condition for existence of w 1 F 2 R + satisfying the above inequalities is 34
which can be shown to be equivalent to ¹¸¹ ¤ . Since, as it was argued in subsection 4.2, in equilibrium a manager always prefers a …rst period o¤er w 1 such that i 1 ¡ w 1 ; ¹ ¢ = (I; N; I) rather than any o¤er w 10 such that i 1 ¡ w 10 ; ¹ ¢ 6 = (I; N; I), A.2.2 Part 2 A necessary condition that has to be satis…ed for i 1 ¡ w 1 ; ¹ ¢ = (N; N; I) is that pro…ts are higher than with (I; I; I) ; that is
Suppose that there exists w 1 2 R 3 + such that i 1 ¡ w 1 ; ¹ ¢ = (N; N; I). Recall from Lemma 2 that
To ease notation in the following we will make use of (14) and (15) but will not substitute (13) until it will become necessary. Under the assumption of part 2 of Proposition 2 we have
Lemmas 7-9 prepare for the proof of part 2 of Proposition 2. (16) and (ii) satis…es (17) with strict inequality.
Lemma 7 Suppose that
Proof. Part (i) of the Lemma is trivial. Given this, to prove part (ii), set w
to both sides of (16) and simplifying we get (20) for (17) to hold it is su¢cient that Proof. Suppose that the assumption of the Lemma is true. By Lemma 7 set w 1 F = 0 without loss of generality. From (19) totally di¤erentiating with respect to w 1 N and w 1 S we get
This implies that we can increase w 1 S and decrease w 1 N without violating (18) until (16) (16) and (19) hold with equality and (17) and (18) hold with strict inequality.
Proof. By Lemma 7 set w Multiplying through by (2 ¡ p) we get
Subtracting w 1 N (1 ¡ p) from both sides we get
Recalling that w > 0 for all (¹; p) 2 (0; 1) 2 , when ¹ increases to ¹ 0 2 (¹; ¹ ¤ ), if we increase w 1 S and w 1 N by the same (absolute) amount so as to satisfy (19) for ¹ 0 , (23) will still be satis…ed and so will (17) and (18) .
To conclude the proof we only need to show that the di¤erence between the expected pro…t under (N; N; I) and under (I; I; I) is increasing with ¹ and decreasing with z. Let Variance of pro…ts for a …rm with a manager in his second period and beginning of period probability of being good equal to ¹. 
